I am sorry I have fallen down on the job. I have failed to update everyone about the Barth conference. I have a few good excuses, but, that aside, the best reparation I can make is to direct you to Travis McMaken's blog. He has given brief updates on the last two days. So visit his site or the individual posts linked below:
Barth Conference Day 2 (well, listed as Day 1 on his blog)
Barth Conference Day 3.
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I do have one thing that I would like to say, however, in regard to the last lecture-block today on the role of grace and justification in the theologies of Thomas and Karl. Both Joseph Warykow (In the RC corner from Notre Dame) and Amy Marga (In the P corner from Luther Seminary) noted the significant overlap in Barth and Thomas' doctrines of justification and even in the relationship of justification to Christian life (i.e., participation in Christ or life in God, depending on who you are talking to).
The point of contact between Barth and Roman Catholicism on the nature of grace and justification was taken from the intro. of Barth's survey of reconciliation CD IV.1, particularly the small print section on pages 84-88, where Barth interacts with Catholic dogmatician B. Bartmann's work from 1929. In this section, Barth begins with a harsh judgment and a touch of dismay. "In the light of the latest doctrine in relation to the Virgin Mary (1950), the proclamation of which has shed a new and garish light on the situation, we can only say that, humanly speaking, they have diverged hopelessly," (84).
Now there is no reason to recount the lectures here, but both Warykow and Marga seemed to agree on one substantial point concerning Barth's interpretation of Catholic theologies of grace. Whether or not Bartmann's theology succumbs to Barth's accusations (namely regarding a supposed bifurcation of grace and concomitantly the entrusting of grace to the human subject in such a way that it can be a used as a commodity by the human regardless of the active presence of God), Barth's criticisms of the "Romanist" perspective of grace do not really hold up when it comes to Aquinas. It must be said, both noted this is to be the case generally speaking, though there might be specific areas of substantial disagreement reaching beyond form and terminology.
I have one area of disagreement I would like to note, and I'll do so by way of a quick and certainly not well crafted hypothetical narrative, told in large part with Barthian dogmatic terminology. So, once upon a time . . .
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Nathan Maddox is a sinful man, a man who quite frequently lives in sin and denies his true reality as bound up and defined de facto by the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. For, you see, when Nathan sins and lives out a lie against God and himself, when he does so regardless of his acknowledgement of his sin as such, his life is still bound up in the "Yes" of God to him in Jesus Christ. Of course, this "Yes" includes the "No," the judgment of Nathan's denial of his true existence. But, as Barth would say, "the No is said for the sake of the Yes."
Again, in other words, Nathan Maddox, despite his awful ways and works( like bashing peoples mailboxes in with baseball bats, kicking animals, and the like) is hid in the life of Christ because of the first of all of God's ways and works ad extra, namely the election and reconciliation of Nathan Maddox and his fellow creatures. Still, make no mistake! Nathan Maddox and his fellow creatures do sin; they do the impossibly possible, (see above with the bats and animals).
But there is more to the story. Nathan Maddox also knows that he is an awful, indeed sinful person; he knows he is only reconciled to God because of the person and work of Christ who has, as one contemporary interpreter of Barth has put it, "saved sinful humanity [read: Nathan Maddox] without [his] cooperation or consent," (Neder, Participation in Christ, 46). Nathan Maddox as the finite sinful creature, knows of his de facto status before God and in Christ, and he also knows (again as the finite sinful creature he is) that his own de jure full participation in Christ is, by some measure, an "already and not yet." This makes his subjective participation (though not his objective "status") -- as the same interpreter has put it -- "a teleological reality," (ibid.).
Now, on a day much like today Nathan Maddox wakes up, brushes his teeth, and does the normal things that a created, finite human being might do. But today, in covetousness and anger, Nathan Maddox also does something else. He carries out a plan he has been deliberating for quite sometime. He kills his neighbor, the owner of 1949 Ford Woody. You see, Nathan has wanted a Ford Woody since his junior year of high school, a time period in his life when his own personal tastes for commodities and trinkets took a turn down vintage lane. He has asked God to remove this obsession with created material from him, but his pride and concomitantly his sloth are bound up in the events of his life. He feels as though he prays to no avail, and his lust for a Ford Woody cannot be satisfied.
So, on a day much like today, Nathan Maddox kills his neighbor, steals the 1949 Ford Woody, and is killed in an automobile accident while fleeing the scene. For the sake of the point of the story, we will assume that Nathan Maddox is killed before the Holy Spirit comes to him post-murder event, awakening him to his objective reality in Christ and commanding new life.
Now, for the money question: Upon this hypothetical Nathan Maddox's death, does he "go to hell," whatever that might mean for the Barthian? Put more concretely, is Nathan's election and reconcilation supposedly achieved in Christ without cooperation or consent in any way invalidated by what some, namely Thomas Aquinas, would call a mortal, irreparable sin?
According to Barth, for all intents and purposes (and regardless of what radical Barthians who don't like Barth's objective subjective split think), no. The answer would be no. Nathan Maddox died in Christ, and his life was hid therein. Using the language of Thomas and the Greek metaphysical tradition, the infusion of grace that Nathan Maddox experienced did not become dormant or take flight from his soul. His justification was not taken from him, and as such, his participation in the life of God and his possibility for receiving the Beatific Vision was not annulled because of this so-called mortal sin.
Now, my question: Does Barth have a fundamentally different conception of grace and justification than Thomas Aquinas? Or does he not?
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
Monday, June 20, 2011
Wolfhart Pannenberg and Barthian Subjectivity
In the first volume of his Systematic Theology, Wolfhart Pannenberg accuses Barth of failing to uproot the most basic elements of his theology from the anthropocentric soil that nurtured the forest that was 19th and 20th century Protestant Liberalism. What makes Pannenberg's critique so mind-blowing is the doctrinal loci that he names as the source of Barth's supposed failure: the doctrine of revelation through Romans and on into I.1-2 of the Dogmatics. Essentially, Pannenberg believes that Barth grounded the task of theology in the subjectivity of the individual, and thus failed to establish a source and norm for theology outside the human being's self-awareness and individual apprehension. Astounding? I say yes! But wait; there's more. In leveling this criticism against Barth on this point, Pannenberg also equates Barth's "anthropocentrism" with the relation of the feeling of absolute dependence as legitimate grounding of the theological task in Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. Pannenberg also aligns Barth's supposed anthropocentric subjectivity with Ritschl and Hermann's foundation for constructing doctrine in the faith of the individual subject in Jesus Christ. For Pannenberg, the difference in the content theological reflection following the concept of faith for the four theologians is irrelevant at this point. What is relevant is the constitutive role of faith in the task of theological thinking in the the respective systems of doctrine of these four theologians (i.e., the relation of the thinking subject to the undertaking of the theological task by said subject). In short, according to Pannenberg, while the content of their positive theological statements on faith are different, they all share a common method for understanding the role of the subject in the process of theological construction. All four, Pannenberg believes, ground the theological task in individual subject. This basic methodological congruency, according to Pannenberg, reveals the underlining individualistic anthropocentrism typical of Liberal Protestantism, an anthropocentrism that Barth not only failed to upend, but also failed to steer clear of in his own theology.
So Pannenberg on the four theologians:
Schleiermacher --
"By making subjective belief the basis for dogmatics Schleiermacher combined the religious subjectivism of Pietism, the reference to the church community and its doctrinal tradition, and the standpoint of individuality as the principle of critical appropriation of tradition." (ST, I: 42).
Ritschl --
"We also find a grounding of theology, and especially dogmatics, in a prior certainty or experience of faith in 19th-century theologians who were not under the influence of revival piety, especially Albrecht Ritschl. . . . Ritschl developed the thesis that we can appreciate the full scope of the historical work of Jesus only in the light of the faith of the Christian community, and therefore we have to understand and evaluate every part of the Christian doctrine from the standpoint of the redeemed community of Christ." (43).
Herrmann --
"Wilhelm Herrmann's question (1892) regarding the historical Christ as the basis of faith could not be pressed radically because faith here was always the presupposition of the argument" (ibid.).
and Barth --
"Barth wanted to cling to the twofold assumption that the reality of God and his Word precedes faith and is a fixed given for dogmatics from the very first. But the second thesis could be introduced only by way of the concept of the act of faith. The inevitable result was that Barth could no longer present unambiguously, as he intended, the priority of God and his Word over the act of faith. . . . The starting point of this new approach, with the reflections on risk, courage, and petitio principii, remains imprisioned in the religious subjectivism from which Barth wished to free himself" (44-5).
Here is where I have to take issue with Pannenberg's accusation of Barth and his correlation of these four theologians. First, what was "the religious subjectivism from which Barth wished to free himself?" From Romans to the early Dogmatics and beyond, it seems one would have a very difficult time arguing that the religious subjectivism haunting Barth was simply accepted and recapitulated despite his own criticism of Liberal Protestantism. For Barth, the subject who is met by revelation is recreated in the meeting and must come to terms with the event of revelation by witnessing to its singular (and recapitulating) reality. While serving as the ground for theological witness, the event does not garuantee the veracity of unadulterated facticity of a constructed theology. The task of theology is then included within this "coming to terms" with the event of revelation, but this event does not lead into or open up a space for static theological reflection free from future correction (a point Pannenberg himself would like to uphold but in a very different way). As such, the source of theological thinking is not grounded in the subject but comes from without, demanding theological thinking as a response of gratitude.
This is where we have to differentiate between the subjectivism that Barth reacted against and the form of subjectivism coincident with Barth's understanding of the task of theology. Barth's desire to overcome a certain form of subjectivism is best understood in light of the type of subjectivism he does espouse in Romans and beyond. For Barth, revelation is not generally accessible to all humankind on the basis of an inner subjective dispensation or essence. The dogmatic task cannot be universally "do-able" because of some natural capability inherent within the human subject. For Barth, just the opposite is the case. While it is true that a person might make "true" or coherent doctrinal statements irrespective of the eventuality of revelation, the person making such statements is not really "doing theology," but something entirely different. Such a person is not following revelation with their heart and mind; he or she is not witnessing to the reality of revelation, at least not intentionally or purposefully. As such, the task of theology does not give itself to such a person in any decipherable way. To put it idiomatically, even a broken clock can be right twice a day, but the broken clock is still broken.
Over against such notions of inherent disposition toward or capability for the theological task as part of the essential make-up of the subject, as I have mentioned, Barth stressed the recreation of the subject. According to Barth, the revelation of God by its very nature is a subject forming event -- dissolving the old and re-instating the new again and again and again. As McCormack has demonstrated in his fine work, this is true for Barth's theology from Romans to the last volume of the Dogmatics, though the content of revelation and the meaning of the act clearly develop. So, as I read Barth, he never had a problem with understanding the faith of the subject as an indispensable aspect of really "doing theology." And so, returning to and answering my own question, Barth's indispensable "subject" we might say is a different subject than the one he was reacting against because it is a post eventual subject. It is a subject that is oriented to an event, WHO is the object of theology. As such, it makes little sense for Pannenberg to accuse Barth of failing to overcome the centrality of the subject with regard to the dogmatic task when Barth's problem was not with the centrality of the subject per se.
But my critique of Pannenberg, can also be found within Pannenberg's own ST. For this, we have to go ch.3. Here we find Pannenberg's discussion of religion as an anthropological phenomenon. Tracing the shift of the authoritative center of the Protestant theological task from the Scripture Principle (whether emphasized as the subjective appropriation or objective truthfulness of the text) to phenomenological study of the religious individual and/or community, Pannenberg again blows the anthropocentrism whistle on Schleiermacher and his theological method. "Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion," Pannenberg states, " gave the independence of religion a new foundation. Religion no longer owed its freedom from metaphysics and moral philosophy to the authority of the truth of God. It now had a basis of independence in anthropology with its claim to be a separate province in the mind (Speeches, p.21). The concept of God was now a product of religion, and it did not necessarily belong to it (pp. 93ff., 97ff.). Later Schleiermacher would link religion (or piety) more closely with the concept. In The Christian Faith, the feeling of absolute dependence stands on its own. It is not an effect of faith in God." (ST I:126)
Pannenberg goes on to explain his reading of Schleiermacher in more detail. But, he basically concludes with the final point given in the quote above: the God-consciousness of the individual is not a consequence of the knowledge of God gifted to the subject from without (by a faith invoking experience or event perhaps?); instead, it is an expression of religion or piety belonging to the make-up of the subject from within. It is basically an essential component of the subject's being.
For now, I am not an expert on Schleiermacher. I only have a basic knowledge of the new scholarship on Schleiermacher's theology and only a bit more knowledge of Barth's reading of Schly via Troeltsch. But whether or not Pannenberg gets Schleiermacher right is tertiary. What should be obvious is that Pannenberg betrays his earlier critique of Barth by unpacking his understanding of Schleiermacher's notion of subjectivity, which is, quite obviously, antithetical to Barth's notion of subjectivity. If Pannenberg would have explained the different forms of subjectivity and the subject's relation to nature of revelation and the theological task in 19th and 20th century theology when he was lumping Barth into the Liberalism category, he might have seen that Barth's understanding of the subject "doing theology" is nothing like Pannenberg's Schleiermacher. As such, to suggest that Barth never overcame the theological anthropocentrism of Liberal Protestantism is really nothing more than a two-fold oversimplification. In Pannenberg's accusation, both terms-- "subjectivism" and "anthropocentism" -- are so broad they virtually become meaningless; with that, Pannenberg's critique becomes meaningless as well (at least from this angle).
Pannenberg would have done better to level a critique against Barth's relation of the person to the task of theology by first differentiating the various concepts of subjectivity, faith, and the theological task of the faithful person current in modern theology. If we read Pannenberg's argument against Barth in light of Pannenberg's own theological goals, I think we get a better sense of Pannenberg's worry when it comes to subjectivity than we do from simply looking at his argument against Barth on its own terms. Furthermore, from what I've read of Pannenberg thus far, we might also realize that his own take on the issue could use a bit more of Barth's post-eventual subjectivism.
So Pannenberg on the four theologians:
Schleiermacher --
"By making subjective belief the basis for dogmatics Schleiermacher combined the religious subjectivism of Pietism, the reference to the church community and its doctrinal tradition, and the standpoint of individuality as the principle of critical appropriation of tradition." (ST, I: 42).
Ritschl --
"We also find a grounding of theology, and especially dogmatics, in a prior certainty or experience of faith in 19th-century theologians who were not under the influence of revival piety, especially Albrecht Ritschl. . . . Ritschl developed the thesis that we can appreciate the full scope of the historical work of Jesus only in the light of the faith of the Christian community, and therefore we have to understand and evaluate every part of the Christian doctrine from the standpoint of the redeemed community of Christ." (43).
Herrmann --
"Wilhelm Herrmann's question (1892) regarding the historical Christ as the basis of faith could not be pressed radically because faith here was always the presupposition of the argument" (ibid.).
and Barth --
"Barth wanted to cling to the twofold assumption that the reality of God and his Word precedes faith and is a fixed given for dogmatics from the very first. But the second thesis could be introduced only by way of the concept of the act of faith. The inevitable result was that Barth could no longer present unambiguously, as he intended, the priority of God and his Word over the act of faith. . . . The starting point of this new approach, with the reflections on risk, courage, and petitio principii, remains imprisioned in the religious subjectivism from which Barth wished to free himself" (44-5).
Here is where I have to take issue with Pannenberg's accusation of Barth and his correlation of these four theologians. First, what was "the religious subjectivism from which Barth wished to free himself?" From Romans to the early Dogmatics and beyond, it seems one would have a very difficult time arguing that the religious subjectivism haunting Barth was simply accepted and recapitulated despite his own criticism of Liberal Protestantism. For Barth, the subject who is met by revelation is recreated in the meeting and must come to terms with the event of revelation by witnessing to its singular (and recapitulating) reality. While serving as the ground for theological witness, the event does not garuantee the veracity of unadulterated facticity of a constructed theology. The task of theology is then included within this "coming to terms" with the event of revelation, but this event does not lead into or open up a space for static theological reflection free from future correction (a point Pannenberg himself would like to uphold but in a very different way). As such, the source of theological thinking is not grounded in the subject but comes from without, demanding theological thinking as a response of gratitude.
This is where we have to differentiate between the subjectivism that Barth reacted against and the form of subjectivism coincident with Barth's understanding of the task of theology. Barth's desire to overcome a certain form of subjectivism is best understood in light of the type of subjectivism he does espouse in Romans and beyond. For Barth, revelation is not generally accessible to all humankind on the basis of an inner subjective dispensation or essence. The dogmatic task cannot be universally "do-able" because of some natural capability inherent within the human subject. For Barth, just the opposite is the case. While it is true that a person might make "true" or coherent doctrinal statements irrespective of the eventuality of revelation, the person making such statements is not really "doing theology," but something entirely different. Such a person is not following revelation with their heart and mind; he or she is not witnessing to the reality of revelation, at least not intentionally or purposefully. As such, the task of theology does not give itself to such a person in any decipherable way. To put it idiomatically, even a broken clock can be right twice a day, but the broken clock is still broken.
Over against such notions of inherent disposition toward or capability for the theological task as part of the essential make-up of the subject, as I have mentioned, Barth stressed the recreation of the subject. According to Barth, the revelation of God by its very nature is a subject forming event -- dissolving the old and re-instating the new again and again and again. As McCormack has demonstrated in his fine work, this is true for Barth's theology from Romans to the last volume of the Dogmatics, though the content of revelation and the meaning of the act clearly develop. So, as I read Barth, he never had a problem with understanding the faith of the subject as an indispensable aspect of really "doing theology." And so, returning to and answering my own question, Barth's indispensable "subject" we might say is a different subject than the one he was reacting against because it is a post eventual subject. It is a subject that is oriented to an event, WHO is the object of theology. As such, it makes little sense for Pannenberg to accuse Barth of failing to overcome the centrality of the subject with regard to the dogmatic task when Barth's problem was not with the centrality of the subject per se.
But my critique of Pannenberg, can also be found within Pannenberg's own ST. For this, we have to go ch.3. Here we find Pannenberg's discussion of religion as an anthropological phenomenon. Tracing the shift of the authoritative center of the Protestant theological task from the Scripture Principle (whether emphasized as the subjective appropriation or objective truthfulness of the text) to phenomenological study of the religious individual and/or community, Pannenberg again blows the anthropocentrism whistle on Schleiermacher and his theological method. "Schleiermacher's Speeches on Religion," Pannenberg states, " gave the independence of religion a new foundation. Religion no longer owed its freedom from metaphysics and moral philosophy to the authority of the truth of God. It now had a basis of independence in anthropology with its claim to be a separate province in the mind (Speeches, p.21). The concept of God was now a product of religion, and it did not necessarily belong to it (pp. 93ff., 97ff.). Later Schleiermacher would link religion (or piety) more closely with the concept. In The Christian Faith, the feeling of absolute dependence stands on its own. It is not an effect of faith in God." (ST I:126)
Pannenberg goes on to explain his reading of Schleiermacher in more detail. But, he basically concludes with the final point given in the quote above: the God-consciousness of the individual is not a consequence of the knowledge of God gifted to the subject from without (by a faith invoking experience or event perhaps?); instead, it is an expression of religion or piety belonging to the make-up of the subject from within. It is basically an essential component of the subject's being.
For now, I am not an expert on Schleiermacher. I only have a basic knowledge of the new scholarship on Schleiermacher's theology and only a bit more knowledge of Barth's reading of Schly via Troeltsch. But whether or not Pannenberg gets Schleiermacher right is tertiary. What should be obvious is that Pannenberg betrays his earlier critique of Barth by unpacking his understanding of Schleiermacher's notion of subjectivity, which is, quite obviously, antithetical to Barth's notion of subjectivity. If Pannenberg would have explained the different forms of subjectivity and the subject's relation to nature of revelation and the theological task in 19th and 20th century theology when he was lumping Barth into the Liberalism category, he might have seen that Barth's understanding of the subject "doing theology" is nothing like Pannenberg's Schleiermacher. As such, to suggest that Barth never overcame the theological anthropocentrism of Liberal Protestantism is really nothing more than a two-fold oversimplification. In Pannenberg's accusation, both terms-- "subjectivism" and "anthropocentism" -- are so broad they virtually become meaningless; with that, Pannenberg's critique becomes meaningless as well (at least from this angle).
Pannenberg would have done better to level a critique against Barth's relation of the person to the task of theology by first differentiating the various concepts of subjectivity, faith, and the theological task of the faithful person current in modern theology. If we read Pannenberg's argument against Barth in light of Pannenberg's own theological goals, I think we get a better sense of Pannenberg's worry when it comes to subjectivity than we do from simply looking at his argument against Barth on its own terms. Furthermore, from what I've read of Pannenberg thus far, we might also realize that his own take on the issue could use a bit more of Barth's post-eventual subjectivism.
Sunday, June 19, 2011
2011 Barth Conference Journal: Day 1
Tonight was the opening night for the 2011 Karl Barth Conference co-sponsored by Princeton Seminary’s Center for Barth Studies and the Thomistic Institute of the Pontifical Faculty of the Immaculate Conception at the Dominican House Studies in Washington D.C. The conference title follows its unique subject matter and implicitly speaks to its direction and concerns, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: An Unofficial Protestant-Catholic Dialogue.
The night began with a banquet, which I, not so unfortunately, had to miss. Not so unfortunate because I was afforded the opportunity of picking up Father Guy Mansini, OSB, associate professor of systematic theology at Saint Meinard in Louisville, KY from the Newark airport.
Along with my friend who accompanied me, Father Mansini and I had our own Protestant-Catholic theological dialogue of sorts, mostly consisting of theological small talk regarding our interests and the likely coincidences and dissonances of our theological concerns. We did briefly discuss Barth’s take on the place of the ecumenical creeds (particularly the first four) as they are oriented to the theological task. We also spoke briefly on Barth’s understanding of submission to the creeds and in what way they are to be considered biding or guiding parameters in church theology.
We arrived in Princeton in time for the introductory remarks by Professor Bruce McCormack and Father Thomas Joseph White, O.P.
Both Professor McCormack and Father White indicated that the some of the churches are currently in a time of ecclesiastical transition, which for those interested, might open up new possibilities by way of ecumenical dialogue and theology across the Protestant-Catholic divide. The locus of and intent behind ecumenical discussion, they both suggested, seems to be shifting as well. Protestants and Catholics are now concerning themselves with points of doctrinal divergence that cannot so easily be overcome or obfuscated by swift linguistic maneuvering and/or doctrinal-grammatical rearrangement. Rather, both speakers noted (and particularly Prof. McCormack on this point), many concerned theologians and laypersons already at the ecumenical table have come to an sincere admittance that Protestants and Catholics do have fundamental matters of disagreement in doctrine -- disagreements that cut to the core of the common faith we profess and strive to confess. Moreover, others are now coming to the table because they feel welcome to voice perceived discrepancies without fear of spoiling the convivial atmosphere.
Such admittances to serious doctrinal disagreements do not have to and most certainly should not require Protestants and Catholics to put their mutual respect and common aim aside. Admittance to serious differences should not lead to a rejection of humility. Nor, when properly perceived, should admittance birth the desire to be excused from the ecumenical table. On the contrary, the common profession of faith should rightly encourage Protestants and Catholics alike to press on to the mark of unity. It is true that divergences can no longer be remedied by a form of mutual congeniality and consensus wiggled out by way of broad doctrinal statements. But better, genuine congeniality and consensus might now arise freely and openly through clear, frank, and respectful discussion for the sake of mutual understanding and clarity.
With this approach, Protestants and Catholics might be best suited to treat each other with the kind of respect and integrity all deserve. As Father White put it, we respect one another and our shared belief in the Lordship of Christ in and through our common search for truth together, and this truth includes bringing our concrete disagreements to the fore.
The night began with a banquet, which I, not so unfortunately, had to miss. Not so unfortunate because I was afforded the opportunity of picking up Father Guy Mansini, OSB, associate professor of systematic theology at Saint Meinard in Louisville, KY from the Newark airport.
Along with my friend who accompanied me, Father Mansini and I had our own Protestant-Catholic theological dialogue of sorts, mostly consisting of theological small talk regarding our interests and the likely coincidences and dissonances of our theological concerns. We did briefly discuss Barth’s take on the place of the ecumenical creeds (particularly the first four) as they are oriented to the theological task. We also spoke briefly on Barth’s understanding of submission to the creeds and in what way they are to be considered biding or guiding parameters in church theology.
We arrived in Princeton in time for the introductory remarks by Professor Bruce McCormack and Father Thomas Joseph White, O.P.
Both Professor McCormack and Father White indicated that the some of the churches are currently in a time of ecclesiastical transition, which for those interested, might open up new possibilities by way of ecumenical dialogue and theology across the Protestant-Catholic divide. The locus of and intent behind ecumenical discussion, they both suggested, seems to be shifting as well. Protestants and Catholics are now concerning themselves with points of doctrinal divergence that cannot so easily be overcome or obfuscated by swift linguistic maneuvering and/or doctrinal-grammatical rearrangement. Rather, both speakers noted (and particularly Prof. McCormack on this point), many concerned theologians and laypersons already at the ecumenical table have come to an sincere admittance that Protestants and Catholics do have fundamental matters of disagreement in doctrine -- disagreements that cut to the core of the common faith we profess and strive to confess. Moreover, others are now coming to the table because they feel welcome to voice perceived discrepancies without fear of spoiling the convivial atmosphere.
Such admittances to serious doctrinal disagreements do not have to and most certainly should not require Protestants and Catholics to put their mutual respect and common aim aside. Admittance to serious differences should not lead to a rejection of humility. Nor, when properly perceived, should admittance birth the desire to be excused from the ecumenical table. On the contrary, the common profession of faith should rightly encourage Protestants and Catholics alike to press on to the mark of unity. It is true that divergences can no longer be remedied by a form of mutual congeniality and consensus wiggled out by way of broad doctrinal statements. But better, genuine congeniality and consensus might now arise freely and openly through clear, frank, and respectful discussion for the sake of mutual understanding and clarity.
With this approach, Protestants and Catholics might be best suited to treat each other with the kind of respect and integrity all deserve. As Father White put it, we respect one another and our shared belief in the Lordship of Christ in and through our common search for truth together, and this truth includes bringing our concrete disagreements to the fore.
Tuesday, June 7, 2011
Resurrection as the Real . . . (and you can get over it).
"If Paul--quite apart from his general opposition to the idea that faith has a 'wage'--cannot subordinate hope to the imaginary of a retribution, it is because resurrection has no meaning independently of the universal character of its operation. As soon as it is a question of contingency and grace, all fixing of divisions or distributions is forbidden: 'A single act of righteousness leads to the acquittal and life for all [people]' (Rom. 5.18). The "all [people]" returns without exception. There is no place here for vengeance and resentment. Hell, the roasting spit of enemies, holds no interest for Paul." -- Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford, CA: Standford University Press, 2003), 96.Whether or not Badiou gets Paul right in this quote, or in the book for that matter, is the least of my concerns. What is elemental is the stress on subjectivity. Post Liberal Protestant Christians need a dose of this in light of overreaction against buzz words like 'experience' and 'consciousness.' Juengel rightly shows us in his GMW, and reactions to GMW (e.g., Molnar) show us the battle rages on.
But about Badiou: he sees in Paul an utter conviction in the reality of the Event (here, the Resurrection) and its power to create the individual anew. According to Badiou, for Paul, only when a person is completely worked over with the conviction the Resurrection is the Real will law and its oppressive parameters be subverted. The the law can be a doctrinal form, a metaphysic, an identification of a political body with the Real, or any other type of deification of a particular cultural ideal/current.
Doctrinally speaking, this conviction includes the subversion of the law as it is projected into an eternal future or an afterlife. It also includes the subversion of the law that chooses to doubt the Resurrection as the Real, inevitably falling back identity mediated through the law resulting in yet another tribalism. Here we are not talking about historicality or some modern notion of factuality. The Real subverts such notions, dissolving them in the wake of its overarching Reality of another form. Cataloging the Resurrection event in the annals of history as a touchstone for faith and action is a bastardized way to go about relating to the Real. It is a movement of law.
Also and again according to Badiou's reading of Paul, if any idea of hope and expectation for the triumph of love is to wholly ground action, then the projection of the Real into a future locale or event with a present idea of justice must be surrendered. Along with it, all attempts to hide it underneath or within a tribal law and grammar must also be left by the wayside. The projection of tribal law into the future (generally played out in some grand final law court culminating in a separation of brothers, mothers, and fathers according to the unknown-but-surprisingly-similar-to-my-rule Rule), is finally a rejection of Resurrection as the Real as well. Instead one (the subject,)seized by the Resurrection Event, can only be obstinate here and now in post-eventual support of Resurrection's Reality. The rejection of law becomes an issue only as it falls into its place among the ruins. In this respect, living by the Resurrection Event is primarily a progressive and not a reactionary way of existence.
Another way of looking at it: this means that idealistic notions of pure materialism or trancendentalism must both be rejected along with all forms that disguise the one within the other. The conviction must hold that Resurrection cannot be laughed out of material significance into the realm of the failed transcendent, nor can it be thrown up into the sky or into an afterlife in rejection of its reality here and now (leading to the acceptance of the status quo). Both of these ways of dealing with the Resurrection make the same mistake. They fail to take it seriously as an ontologically constitutive reality for God, creation, and the subject. They believe in something else, not the Resurrection Event.
Of course, on this last point Badiou would not follow me. For him, Paul's Resurrection Event is a "fabrication." It is not the Event itself. Rather, Paul's universalism and emphasis on the subject is a parable of sorts, an opportunity for picking up the rubble of failed Transcendence and using it as artillery. So, the question: what to read to understand Badiou's take on the EVENT? Any suggestions? And, please, don't just say Being and Event, give me pg. #s.
Wednesday, June 1, 2011
Ascension Art - Laugh a Little
In one of those massive tomes comprising the Church Dogmatics, Barth remarks that of all the grandeur and pathos Christian art has bequeathed to the world, one particularly fatal flaw was made. Despite countless efforts, Christian art has positively failed to produce an acceptable ascension scene. At least, he says, we all get a good laugh out of it. I would go a step further. Some depictions of the parousia might just be a bit more gut-wrenching. This is particularly the case when the terror-target is overshot, and the artifact lands squarely within the fence-line of Oscar Romero's playground.
But Barth is right; we should let out a good laugh through the apocalyptic air we seem to be breathing at the moment.
Now for the money question: Where does ascending Jesus of Nazareth "go" when he exits the Troposphere? Taking bets: Can he make it to the mesosphere if he holds his breath?
And as for the parousia in the key of J.N. Darby:
But Barth is right; we should let out a good laugh through the apocalyptic air we seem to be breathing at the moment.
Now for the money question: Where does ascending Jesus of Nazareth "go" when he exits the Troposphere? Taking bets: Can he make it to the mesosphere if he holds his breath?
And as for the parousia in the key of J.N. Darby:
Wednesday, May 18, 2011
Barth, 1924: The Resurrection of the Dead
Here's Barth on resurrected life in 1924 from his commentary of 1 Corinthians entitled Resurrection of the Dead. In his reading of Paul, Barth grounds the resurrection of the human being in the central reality and revelation of meaningful existence -- the resurrection of the man Jesus Christ (even here Barth has yet to speak of resurrection largely in terms of salvation history, though he does use the term some). In III/2 (1948), Barth is clear that the end of life for the human creature is concretely the creature's ending time. Humans live in the resurrection of Christ and come to themselves and the reality of their resurrected existence as the Spirit comes to them ever-again and ever-a-new. There is not a continued time, post-temporal, or afterlife life for the human creature in III/2. But in 1924, prior to III/2's release, Barth is not as clear. In his exposition of 1 Cor 15, Barth expounds a notion of "re-predicated" corporeality. He grounds this "re-predication" of human corporeality (as a post-death reality?) in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, though this is by no means his primary emphasis. So Barth:
Also, the problem of general bodily resurrection, of the "re-predication" of human corporeality as a post-death possibility remains. In a 2003 issue of the IJST, Katherine Grieb seems to suggest that Barth was at least indicating some kind of teleology -- a general bodily resurrection of the dead. One article over, David Fergusson indicates just the opposite. In fact, Fergusson thinks Barth completely neglected the the issue of teleology and the general resurrection of the dead and was mistaken in doing so.
I'm not too sure what to make of it, however. It seems Barth's comments on 1 Cor 15 could be read both ways, though, given the history, it would seem to me that Fergusson's take is probably closer to the truth.
The corruptibility, dishonour, and weakness of man is, in fact, that of his corporeality. Death is the death of the body. If death be not only the end--but also the turning point, then the new life must consist in the repredication of [Jesus'] corporeality. To be sown and to rise again must be then applied to the body. The body is man, body in relation to a non-bodily, determined, indeed, by this non-bodily, but body. The change in relationship of the body to this non-bodily is just the resurrection. Not, therefore, some transition of man to a merely non-bodily existence. Of such Paul knows nothing whatever. The persisting subject is rather just the body. . . . This re-predication is the "resurrection of the dead," (191-2).With this, Barth eschews all views related to the immortality of the soul, or even the immortality of a body. Both are highly speculative and concerned with an ideal, not the recreation for authentic existence in Jesus' resurrection. Furthermore, the re-predication of corporeal reality in the resurrection of Jesus and our contingent resurrection living-ness is not distinct from worldly existence. This radical affirmation of resurrected corporeality is a rejection of both escapism and materialism. But does he really confirm an "afterlife" of any sort, meaning a time after the body ceases to function and begins the process of decay? I'm not sure he cares to answer:
Exactly as I am, shall I and will I be God's. Not in passing: the immortality of the soul is placed in dispute by what Paul says here. Instead of the human soul, The Spirit of God appears in the resurrection. That which persists is not the soul (the latter is the predicate, which must give place to something else), but the body, even that, not as an immortal body, but in the transition from life in death to life. It is not that, however, which Paul wants to indicate here, but the positive aspect. Exactly in the place of that which makes me a man, the human soul, is set that which makes God, God, the Spirit of God, that is the complete sovereignty of God, this the Resurrection of the Dead. But exactly in this place! To wish to be to be God's without the body is rebellion against God's will, is secret denial of God, (201).Barth's time-eternity dialectic is not the only dialectic underscoring his reading of Paul. There is also his Adam-Christ dialectic, first majestically expounded in Romans and referenced here again (1 Cor 15.22). Barth is curtailing any illusions of grandeur we might have about ourselves in our present state affairs or projecting our human subjectivity of the now into the glory of a final "all and in all," which necessarily excludes the dialectic that defines human existence now.
He who recognizes himself in Adam and Christ no longer, in fact, asks: With what body shall we come again? as if it were a marvellous fairy-tale which he must "believe." He knows that what is in question is this, his body (but the resurrection of this body), and gives God the honour in fear and trembling, but also in hope, (203).
[T]his man -- that is to say, this body as such -- without this last hope is definitely and entirely outside the Kingdom of God. Within this life of the body as such there exists no possibility of inheriting the Kingdom, to do which one must be the Son coming from heaven, the Lord from heaven (verses 47 et seq.), or one of his own (in the future resurrection).If within this life -- the life of the Adam-Christ dialectic -- there is no possibility of inheriting the Kingdom, but there is a change in relationship between the body [time] and the non-bodily [eternity], what does it mean to hold for a "last hope" or "future resurrection?" What is the Kindgom? What relevance does it have for us now, in Barth's logic at this point in time?
Also, the problem of general bodily resurrection, of the "re-predication" of human corporeality as a post-death possibility remains. In a 2003 issue of the IJST, Katherine Grieb seems to suggest that Barth was at least indicating some kind of teleology -- a general bodily resurrection of the dead. One article over, David Fergusson indicates just the opposite. In fact, Fergusson thinks Barth completely neglected the the issue of teleology and the general resurrection of the dead and was mistaken in doing so.
I'm not too sure what to make of it, however. It seems Barth's comments on 1 Cor 15 could be read both ways, though, given the history, it would seem to me that Fergusson's take is probably closer to the truth.
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
Bonhoeffer: The Christian Life for the World
Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote the following in his Ethics while working with the resistance movement undercover in the Abwehr. I believe they should give us pause before ascribing the death of Osama bin Laden or any of our responses to it to Bonhoeffer's legacy.
"Radicalism always arises from a conscious or unconscious hatred of what exists. Christian radicalism, whether it would flee the world or improve it, comes from the hatred of creation. The radical cannot forgive God for having created what is. It is Ivan Karamazov, the one who totally at odds with the created world, who creates the figure of a radical Jesus in the legend of the Grand Inquisitor. When evil becomes powerful in the world, it simultaneously injects the Christian with the poison of radicalism. Reconciliation with the world as it is, which is given to the Christian by Christ, is then called betrayal and denial of Christ. In its place come bitterness, suspicion, and contempt for human beings and the world. Love that believes all things, bears all things, and hopes all things, love that loves the world in its very wickedness with the love of God (John 3:16), becomes -- by limiting love to the closed circle of the pious -- a pharisaical refusal of love for the wicked. The open church of Jesus Christ, which serves the world to the end, becomes a kind of supposed ur-Christian ideal church-community that in turn mistakenly confuses the realization of a Christian idea with the reality of the living Jesus Christ. Thus a world that has become evil succeeds in making Christians evil also. The identical sickness dismisses the world and radicalizes Christians. In both cases it is hatred toward the world, whether it is the hate of the godless or the pious. On both sides it is refusal to believe in God's creation. One cannot drive out any devils with Beelzebub." -- Bonhoeffer, DBW vol.6, Ethics, 155-6.
"Radicalism always arises from a conscious or unconscious hatred of what exists. Christian radicalism, whether it would flee the world or improve it, comes from the hatred of creation. The radical cannot forgive God for having created what is. It is Ivan Karamazov, the one who totally at odds with the created world, who creates the figure of a radical Jesus in the legend of the Grand Inquisitor. When evil becomes powerful in the world, it simultaneously injects the Christian with the poison of radicalism. Reconciliation with the world as it is, which is given to the Christian by Christ, is then called betrayal and denial of Christ. In its place come bitterness, suspicion, and contempt for human beings and the world. Love that believes all things, bears all things, and hopes all things, love that loves the world in its very wickedness with the love of God (John 3:16), becomes -- by limiting love to the closed circle of the pious -- a pharisaical refusal of love for the wicked. The open church of Jesus Christ, which serves the world to the end, becomes a kind of supposed ur-Christian ideal church-community that in turn mistakenly confuses the realization of a Christian idea with the reality of the living Jesus Christ. Thus a world that has become evil succeeds in making Christians evil also. The identical sickness dismisses the world and radicalizes Christians. In both cases it is hatred toward the world, whether it is the hate of the godless or the pious. On both sides it is refusal to believe in God's creation. One cannot drive out any devils with Beelzebub." -- Bonhoeffer, DBW vol.6, Ethics, 155-6.
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